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THE “MATERIALITY” OF THE INCENTIVE
COMPENSATION BAN IN HIGHER EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION
Students of this generation are continuously troubled with the burden of
loans taken out to attend their college of choice. Generally, the increase in salary
as a result of their education will be enough to repay student loan debt. 1 For first
time students at public and private four-year colleges, twelve year default rates
since 2003 are 12-13%. 2 Conversely, twelve-year default rates for borrowers at
for-profit colleges is 47%. 3 More than 3 out of 4 students who graduate with a
bachelor’s degree from a for-profit college will be saddled with $20,000 or more
in debt. 4 Certain for-profit colleges accept up to 90% of their gross tuition from
federal grants, loans, or scholarships. 5 The Department of Education has set
forth quality assurance standards for institutions that accept federal funds to
ensure they do not engage in activity that the Department of Education deems
predatory. 6 The Program Participation Agreement (PPA) administers
regulations for colleges in order to ensure the use of accurate graduation
statistics, student success, and legitimate educational practices. 7
Institutions may only participate in Title IV aid programs if they sign a
written agreement with the Secretary of the Department of Education. 8 Title IV
financial aid includes grants, federal subsidized and unsubsidized loans, and
need based opportunity grants from the government. 9 Section 667.13 of the PPA
sets out the standards that these institutions agree to when entering the PPA with
the government. 10 In particular, schools agree to an Incentive Compensation Ban
(ICB), paying employees bonuses based solely on positive recruitment
performance. 11 The ICB states that an employee or independent party may not
receive payment based on the number of students they recruit to a school. 12 The
1
FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES BY THE NUMBERS, https://capseecenter.org/research/by-the-numbers/forprofit-college-infographic/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Program Participation Agreement 34 CFR § 668.14 (2012).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
TITLE IV FINANCIAL AID AUTHORIZATION FAQ, https://www.gvsu.edu/studentaccounts/title-iv-financial-aid-authorization-faq-24.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
10
34 CFR § 668.14.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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ICB does not forbid schools from marketing themselves to students, but payment
cannot be based on enrollment numbers. 13 Multiple for-profit colleges have been
accused, and admitted to, paying persons in violations of the ICB. 14 However,
even after the government noticed such violations, some of these schools
continued to receive Title IV funds. 15 Under the False Claims Act (FCA),
promises made to the government only give rise to liability if it is determined
that the promise was “material” to the government’s decision to enter the
contract. 16 This “materiality” standard has caused differing opinions between
circuits about the necessity of the ICB in the government’s decision about
whether to enter the contract. 17 Currently, there is a Circuit split between the
Eighth and Tenth Circuit as to whether the ICB gives rise to liability under the
FCA. 18
For-profit schools would risk losing substantial amounts of revenue in
tuition funded by federal aid every year if their contract under the PPA was
revoked. 19 A number of different infractions have been litigated in the courts in
recent years. 20 Most notably, these schools are accused of paying employees or
outside recruiters bonuses based on enrollment of students, along with altering
records to boost students’ GPAs and attendance records. 21 Often, the crux of
these cases is not the truth of the assertions but whether these actions broke a
“material” promise that affected the government’s decision regarding whether
to pay these institutions. 22 In other cases, investors in these for-profit colleges
sue for security fraud due to the misrepresentation of their enrollment numbers
and tuition revenue. 23

13

Id.
See U.S. Ex Rel. Brooks v. Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. 1279, 1285 (D. Utah 2018); U.S.
v. Sanford-Brown Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 2015); U.S. ex rel. Main v. Oakland City University, 426
F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005).
15
U.S. v. Sanford-Brown Ltd., 840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that the Department of Education had examined Sanford-Brown multiple times and never declined a request for payment of Title IV funds).
16
Universal Health Serv., Inc. v. U.S., 136 U.S. 1989, 1996 (2016).
17
Compare U.S. v. Sanford-Brown Ltd., 840 F.3d at 447-448 with U.S. Ex Rel. Brooks v. Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1305.
18
Mehreen Rasheed, Seventh Circuit Reconsiders Case in Light of Supreme Court’s ‘Implied False Certification’ Holding, KMB LEGAL BLOG (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.kmblegal.com/whistleblower-blog/seventh-circuit-reconsiders-case-light-supreme-courts-implied-false.
19
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION, https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2019).
20
See U.S. ex rel. Main, 426 F.3d. at 916-18; Stevens–Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1305-08;
Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1055-1056 (9th Cir. 2008).
21
See Sanford-Brown Ltd., 840 F.3d at 447-448; Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1297-1305.
22
Id.
23
Id.
14
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For many for-profit colleges, a majority of their gross tuition is made up of
students paying with some type of Title IV aid. 24 For Heritage College, a private
for profit college working under Weston Education, Inc., roughly 97% of their
students received Title IV aid. 25 Remaining eligible to accept federal funds has
become an integral piece of these for-profit colleges business models. Two main
theories have been recognized by the courts for FCA liability when evaluating
ICB claims. 26 First, promissory fraud, which “attaches liability to each and every
claim submitted under a contract obtained through fraudulent statements”. 27
Promissory fraud allows courts to attach liability to past statements made under
false pretenses. 28 Second, the implied false certification theory (IFCT) attaches
liability to every request for payment from the government when they are not in
compliance with the underlying statute; in this case, the PPA. 29 The IFCT looks
at present claims of non-compliance, rather than past representations, such as
promissory fraud. 30 This paper will cover the courts’ analysis of these two legal
theories and the key points that have created differing outcomes. The courts’
precedent points heavily to the determination that the ICB does not rise to a level
of materiality under either of these theories. 31

I.

FALSE CLAIMS ACT

The FCA is the primary vehicle for the government, or private parties on
behalf of the government, to recover funds from those who defraud the
government or its programs. 32 As noted earlier, institutions that want to receive
federal loans from their students must sign a PPA. 33 Signing the PPA gives rise
to liability under the FCA if the institution fails to uphold their material promises
to the government. 34 A condition set forth by the government can be deemed
material in a number of different ways. 35 As stated in Allison Engine Co., Inc. v.
U.S. ex rel. Sanders, “The False Claims Act is not an all-purpose antifraud
24
FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES BY THE NUMBERS, https://capseecenter.org/research/by-the-numbers/forprofit-college-infographic/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
25
U.S. ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educational, Inc., 840 F.3d 494, 498 (8th Cir. 2016).
26
Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1295-1297 (The two theories being promissory fraud and
implied false certification theory).
27
Id. at 1295.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 1296.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 1294.
33
34 CFR § 668.14.
34
Id.
35
Universal Health Serv., 136 U.S. at 2001 (stating that materiality cannot be determined by a single
dispositive fact, must have determinative of the government’s actions).
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statute . . .” In other words, not every misrepresentation is an actionable claim
under the FCA. 36
The FCA attempts to provide remedies for the government when its
contractors do not fulfill the obligations that they are contracted with to
complete. 37 The point is not for the government to sue every contractor who fails
to complete a job to satisfaction. 38 Rather, the FCA was intended to protect the
government against contractors who act far outside the bounds of the contract
that the government is no longer getting the deal they bargained for. 39 However,
this means that even if a provision is not included in their contract with the
government, the contractor is not released from all liability if they have “actual
knowledge” that the provision would have been necessary for payment. 40 For
example, “If the Government failed to specify that guns it orders must actually
shoot, but the defendant knows that the Government routinely rescinds contracts
if the guns do not shoot, the defendant has ‘actual knowledge.’” 41 A reasonable
person would seemingly know that if the government is contracting for guns,
they expect the guns to be functional upon receipt of the weapons. 42
The main controversy surrounding the FCA when applied to for-profit
colleges is what misrepresentations actually give rise to liability under the act. 43
Simply because a term was laid out and agreed to in a government contract does
not give rise to liability. 44 In Univ. Health Services v. United States in rel.
Escobar, the Court ruled that there is no strict liability for a defendant that fails
to disclose the violation of a contractual provision. 45 Meaning that putting a
provision in a contract, does not lead to a dispositive finding of materiality. 46
Furthermore, a misrepresentation is only actionable if the nondisclosure is over
a provision, expressed or implied, that was a material provision the
government’s acceptance of the contract. 47

36
Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 668, 128 S.Ct. 2123, 170 L.Ed.2d
1030 (2008).
37
Universal Health Serv., 136 U.S. at 2003.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 2001.
42
Id.
43
Compare Sanford-Brown Ltd., 840 F.3d at 447-448 with Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at
1305.
44
Universal Health Serv., 136 U.S. at 2001.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 2003.
47
Id. at 2000.
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Different from most professions, institutions receiving Title IV funds from
the Department of Education are unable to pay recruiters based on the numbers
of students they enroll. 48 The ICB bars institutions from “provid[ing] any
commission, bonus, or other incentive payment based directly or indirectly on
success in securing enrollments or financial aid to any persons or entities
engaged in any student recruiting or admission activities or in making decisions
regarding the award of student financial assistance.” 49 However, the ICB has not
always been in place for colleges. 50 Today, for-profit schools are often charged
with contracting personnel, with express or bonus compensation for boosted
enrollment numbers, leading to increases in federal student loans for the
institution. 51 Without the ICB, colleges have engaged in predatory practices that
often deceive potential students, luring them in with false promises and
aggressive advertising. 52 The Obama administration sued multiple colleges over
the job statistics used to lure students, often promising much more lucrative job
opportunities than statistics were able to back up. 53
III. PROMISSORY FRAUD
Promissory fraud is a legal theory that “attaches liability” under the FCA to
every claim submitted to the government, under the terms of a contract, when
the original contract was obtained due to false representations. 54 Courts have
found institutions liable under the FCA for promissory fraud when the
institutions submitted requests for disbursement of Title IV funds that made
“false or fraudulent” statements in their PPA. 55 For a claim to be “false or
fraudulent” a plaintiff must show 4 factors: “(1) that the defendant made false
statements; (2) that the defendant knew that the statements were false; (3) that
the false statements were material to the Government’s decision to enter into a

48

31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.
20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(20).
50
U.S. Department of Education Reinterprets Incentive Compensation Ban, HSE LEGALCURRENTS
(Dec. 2015) https://www.hselaw.com/files/U.S._Department_of_Education_Reinterprets_Incentive_Compensation_Ban.pdf (Starting the ICB in 1992).
51
Id.
52
THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOR-PROFIT COLLEGE COMPANY TO PAY $95.5. MILLION TO SETTLE
CLAIMS OF ILLEGAL RECRUITING, CONSUMER FRAUD AND OTHER VIOLATIONS (Nov. 6, 2015) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/profit-college-company-pay-955-million-settle-claims-illegal-recruiting-consumer-fraud-and.
53
HOW FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES SELL ‘RISKY EDUCATION’ TO THE MOST VULNERABLE.
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=521371034 (last visited Apr. 15, 2019).
54
Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1295.
55
U.S. ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2006).
49
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contract with the defendant, and (4) that the defendant made claims for payment
under the contract that was fraudulently induced.” 56
Litigation in this space heavily revolves around the government proving the
defendant had knowledge of the false statements and that specific statements
made to the Department of Education were material in their execution of the
PPA. 57 How the court defines materiality will be discussed later.
IV. IMPLIED FALSE CERTIFICATION THEORY
The other hook for liability under the FCA in Universal Health Servs. is the
IFCT. 58 The IFCT attaches liability to every claim for payment from the
government that has an implicit promise to comply with all relevant government
regulations. 59 Adversely, University Health Services argued that these claims
have no implicit representations and are not actionable barring actual fraud. 60
To reach a basis of liability under the false certification, there are two conditions
that must be met. 61 “First, the claim does not merely request payment, but also
makes specific representations about the goods or services provided; and second,
the defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory,
regulatory, or contractual requirements makes those representations misleading
half-truths.” 62 Ultimately, the IFCT liability determination revolves around the
finding of whether or not the specific misrepresentation is “material” to the
government’s decision to enter the PPA. 63
The court in Escobar goes into a detailed analysis of why it is necessary for
the government to have a recourse when contractors break material promises. 64
The court analogized, “an applicant for an adjunct position at a local college
makes an actionable misrepresentation when his resume lists prior jobs and then
retirement, but fails to disclose that his “retirement” was a prison stint for
perpetrating a $12 million bank fraud.” 65 In the above situation, it seems clear
that the potential professor concealing his arrest would have most likely weighed
on the School Board’s decision in his hiring.

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1296.
See generally Sanford-Brown Ltd., 840 F.3d 696; Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. 1279.
Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 U.S. at 2002.
Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1296.
Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 U.S. at 2002.
Sanford-Brown Ltd., 840 F.3d at 447.
Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 U.S. at 2001.
Id.
Id. at 2000.
Id.
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V. MATERIALITY
Under Section (b)(4) of the FCA, a term is material to the government, if it
“ha[s] a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment
or receipt of money or property.” 66 Courts also look to the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts for more guidance on the determination of materiality. 67 “A
misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person
to manifest his assent, or if the maker knows that it would be likely to induce the
recipient to do so.” 68 The first determination by the court in Escobar was that
simply because the government identifies a provision to receive payment does
not make that provision material. 69 The court laid out 3 factors in Junius Constr.
Co. v. Cohen for determining the materiality of a promise “(1) whether the
violation goes to the “essence of the bargain, (2) whether the violation is
significant, as opposed to “minor or insubstantial,” and (3) whether the
Government has taken action in response to similar, known violations.” 70 Under
the first element of materiality, courts look at the core of the transaction to
determine whether the misrepresentation goes to the very essence of the
bargain. 71 In Junius Constr., the court held that when a misrepresentation is
vital to the transaction, that is something that goes to the very essence of the
bargain. 72 In that case, the court held that the plaintiff would not have signed
the contract had he known of the possibility that certain permit would be denied,
making it impossible for him to fulfil the exact purpose of the agreement. 73
Furthermore, a person only presenting positive facts about a certain transaction,
while failing to disclose negative aspects that the buyer would have no other way
of knowing, is an actionable misrepresentation. 74
The second element of materially requires that the misrepresentation be
significant, and not only “minor or insubstantial.” 75 The court in Junius Constr.
states that if no one can say, within reason, that the government would have
entered into the contract had the fact been disclosed, then that fact may rise to
materiality. 76 The court seems to combine this standard with the third prong and

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 1996.
Id. at 2002.
Id. at 2002-2003.
Id. at 2003.
Junius Const. Co. v. Cohen, 257 N.Y. 393, 400, 178 N.E. 672, 674 (1931).
Id.
Id.
Id.; See also Stambovsky v. Ackley, 169 A.D.2d 254, 255, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (App. Div. 1991).
Id. at 400.
U.S. ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 543, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943).
Junius Constr., 257 N.Y., at 400, 178 N.E., at 674.
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considers past actions from the government under similar circumstances. 77
However, even if a government agency has continually ignored past violations,
public changes in position on a certain provision is enough to give rise to
materiality. 78 Many cases put forth different off-hand rules on how to determine
materiality, going as far back as to review legislative history when the ICB was
passed. 79 Materiality often comes down to a determination based on the factfinding in specific cases. 80
The other main focus for courts in the materiality determination is the
Restatement Second for Contracts. 81 The comments of the restatement defines
materiality as:
The requirement of materiality may be met in either of two ways. First,
a misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent. Second, it is material if the maker
knows that for some special reason it is likely to induce the particular
recipient to manifest his assent. 82

This definition of materiality seems to give a more lenient standard than the
court in Junius Constr. The court in Junius Constr. necessitates that all three
elements be met for a finding of materiality. 83 However, the Supreme Court in
Escobar kept a heightened standard of materiality than that of what the Second
Restatement of Contracts provides. 84 Seemingly, the Restatement is used more
for guidance, rather than the final determination of materiality under the FCA. 85
VI. ANALYSIS

A. Sanford-Brown College
Sanford-Brown was a for-profit college located in Wisconsin that closed in
May of 2017. 86 From June 2008 to January 2009, Brent Nelson served as a
77

Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 U.S. at 2003.
Id. at 2004 (Knowledge that certain requirements were violated, and has signaled no change in position,
that is strong evidence that the requirements are not material).
79
U.S. ex. Rel. Brooks v. Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1303.
80
Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 U.S. at 2002.
81
Id.
82
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162 (2019).
83
Junius Const. Co. v. Cohen, 257 N.Y. 393, 400, 178 N.E. 672, 674 (1931).
84
Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 U.S. at 2003.
85
Id. (The Court focuses on the Junius factors for a determination of materiality rather than applying the
facts to the Contracts restatement definition).
86
Information for Former Students, Sanford-Brown. https://www.sanfordbrown.edu/INFORMATION%
20FOR%20FORMER%20STUDENTS (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
78
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Director of Education at one of Sanford-Brown’s campuses. 87 During his time
as a director, Nelson observed the use of incentive-based compensation for
student enrollment, failure to refund unearned subsidies, and failure to maintain
necessary records for student progress. 88
In 2014, Nelson brought a claim against Sanford-Brown College under
promissory fraud and IFCT theories of liability. 89 First, the former director of
Sanford-Brown College alleged that directors of the college presented the
government with false records in regard to student progress. 90 These false
records caused students to apply for Title IV funds, which Sanford-Brown
College knew or should have known they were not eligible for. 91 Second, the
former director argued that even if Sanford-Brown college entered into the PPA
with good intentions, they did not continually comply with the PPA. 92
Sanford-Brown set up its defense by arguing that it had entered into the PPA
in good faith and further that its continued compliance was not dispositive of a
material condition for payment. 93 In U.S. ex rel. Main v. Oakland City
University, the court noted that the promise of specific future performance is not
a false statement due to non-compliance at a later date. 94 Furthermore, SanfordBrown cited precedent from the Eighth Circuit which held that the material
factor for payment was the “good-faith entry into the PPA”, rather than
continued compliance. 95 In the brief submitted on behalf of the United States,
the only evidence presented for knowledge of the alleged violations were
witnesses to actions post-signing of the original PPA agreement. 96
The Tenth Circuit rejected the applicability of the doctrine of implied false
certification. 97 Judge Manion, writing for a unanimous bench, held that it was
“unreasonable” for institutions such as Sanford-Brown to continually comply

87

U.S. v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd. 30 F.Supp.3d at 806.
Id. at 809.
89
Id. at 806.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 807.
92
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Rehearing En Banc, U.S. v. Sanford-Brown
Ltd., 2015 WL 4241210 (July 2, 2015).
93
Sanford-Brown Ltd., 840 F.3d at 710.
94
US. Ex rel. Main v. Oakland City University, 426 F.3d at 917.
95
U.S. ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, Inc., 639 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir.2011) (The 8th circuit later distinguished
this case in ex rel. Miller when the point of contention was the False Records Requirement of the PPA rather
than the ICB).
96
Appellant’s Reply Brief, U.S. v. Sanford-Brown Ltd., 2014 WL 7235686 (Dec. 12, 2014).
97
U.S. v. Sanford-Brown Ltd., 840 F.3d at 700.
88
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with the countless pages of legislation incorporated and referenced in the PPA. 98
The court agreed with the holding in U.S. ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, Inc., holding
that absent some type of evidence of fraud before entering into the PPA with the
government, there was no liability under the FCA. 99
However, in 2016 Universal Health Servs. was decided by the Supreme
Court and overruled the Sanford-Brown determination that the IFCT was not
applicable. 100 The case was then remanded back to the Appeals Court for
reconsideration in light of the new precedent. 101 Upon remand, the appellate
court granted summary judgment for Sanford-Brown. The court reasoned that
Sanford-Brown made no misrepresentations when they made their claim for
payment. 102 Additionally, the plaintiff provided no evidence that the infractions
committed by Sanford-Brown were material to the government’s decision to
pay. 103 Finally, the court pointed to evidence showing that the Department of
Education examined Sanford-Brown multiple times in the past and continued to
pay their claims in full. 104 Evidence showing that the government had actual
knowledge that specific agreements were not upheld and it still paid out those
claims points very strongly to those agreements not being material to the
government’s decision. 105

B. Stevens-Henager College
Steven-Henager College is a for-profit college that has multiple campuses
spread out across Utah and Idaho. 106 As of March 2019, Stevens-Henager
College has a 23% graduation rate and roughly several hundred students. 107 In
2013, Steven-Henager College was sued for promissory fraud under the FCA,
due to their inability to comply with the ICB. 108 Generally, admissions
consultants for Stevens-Henager College received bonuses if they recruited a
student who finished thirty-six credits or recruited a total of five students in a
three-month window and maintained a proscribed “conversion ratio” over that
98

Id. at 711.
Id. at 710.
100
Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 U.S. at 2001.
101
Id.
102
U.S. v. Sanford-Brown Ltd., 840 F.3d at 445.
103
Id..
104
Id.
105
Universal Health Servs., Inc., 136 U.S. at 2003.
106
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, CAMPUS LOCATIONS, https://www.stevenshenager.edu/locations (last
visited Apr. 9, 2019).
107
STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/school/?446677-Stevens-Henager_College (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
108
U.S. v. Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1285.
99
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three month period. 109 The “conversion ratio” was calculated by taking the
number of students an admissions consultant actually enrolled and dividing it by
the number of interviews that consultant conducted. 110 For example, if the
admissions consultant conducted 50 interviews with potential students and 30 of
them enrolled at Steven-Henager College, the consultant would have a
conversion ratio of 60%.
In March of 2009, Katie Brooks was hired at Stevens-Henager College as an
admissions consultant with a base salary of $38,000. 111 In 2010, Ms. Brooks
received bonuses of $31,450, which totaled more than 80% of her base salary. 112
Nannette Wride, another admissions consultant for Stevens-Henager College,
was given between four and five separate bonuses based on her success in
enrolling students. 113 Each bonus payment ranged from $1,200 to $4,000, based
on how many students were enrolled during a specific period of time. 114
Stevens-Henager College’s main defense to the claims brought under the
FCA was that they had no reason to believe that the ICB was a material part of
obtaining Title IV eligibility. 115 In the defendant’s brief, the defense pointed to
evidence that over a thirteen-year timeframe, the Department of Education
knowingly paid out claims to colleges who were not in compliance with the
ICB. 116 Additionally, after the disclosure of the ICB violations, the Department
of Education decided to enter into a new PPA agreement with Stevens-Henager
College. 117 Pointing to these key facts, coupled with the wording in Escobar that
the FCA is not an “all-purpose antifraud statute”, Stevens-Henager College
argued that the ICB is not material to the government’s decision for entering the
PPA. 118
The court laid out the three factors that were discussed earlier in Junius
Constr. Co., for their materiality determination. 119 A holistic assessment of these
factors was enough to convince the court that the Department of Education
108
Id. at 1288 (A conversion ratio was used to determine the effectiveness of counselors’ enrollment tactics in
meetings with prospective students).
110
Id. at 1279 (Footnote 1).
111
Id. at 1288.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1300
116
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Government’s Amended Complaint in Intervention, U.S. v. StevensHenager College, 2018 WL 7446425 (June 15, 2018).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Junius Const. Co. v. Cohen, 257 N.Y. at 400.
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viewed the ICB requirement as material. 120 The court began its analysis of the
materiality of the ICB requirement by showing that the PPA stated the required
compliance with the ICB in three separate sections. 121 Second, the court looked
to the legislative history of Congress, pointing to a statute enacted in 1992 that
banned incentives based on enrollment numbers in schools. 122 Third, the court
strayed from concrete precedent and described the opportunity for fraud and
abuse if the ICB was disregarded as a material element of the PPA. 123 Fourth,
the court pointed to a contractual provision in the PPA stating that the
Department of Education may choose to withhold funds if a school was not in
compliance with the ICB. 124 The most influential factor for the court in this case
was that Stevens-Henager College took affirmative steps in concealing their
non-compliance with the ICB requirement. 125
CONCLUSION
For-profit colleges are openly admitting to their wrong-doing and failure to
comply with the federal regulations they contractually agreed to adhere to. 126
Even after the Seventh Circuit’s decision was overturned in Escobar, the court
still attached no liability to the misrepresentations of Sanford-Brown. 127 It seems
as though the PPA was written with rules that are not actually necessary to its
enforcement. 128 The court in United Health Servs. puts the bar of materiality at
“look[ing] to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the
alleged misrepresentation. 129 The court in Sanford-Brown held that, even with
clear evidence that the a college had been operating in violation of the PPA,
institutions are still allowed to accept Title IV student loans. 130 This created an
inference that any violation of the PPA was not automatically material to their
decision. 131
The ability for the government to reject claims for payment from colleges

120

U.S. v. Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1302.
Id.
122
Id. at 1303.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1304.
125
Id.
126
United States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educational, Inc. at 499, 502, and 503.
127
U.S. v. Sanford-Brown Ltd., 840 F.3d 445 at 447.
128
Id. at 448 (Stating that there have been past cases with claims that violated the PPA but were not
actionable due to lack of materiality).
129
Universal Health Serv. 136 U.S. at 2002.
130
U.S. v. Sanford-Brown Ltd., 788 F.3d at 714.
131
Id.
121
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based on non-compliance with the ICB weigh on opposite sides of materiality
for the courts in the above cases. In Sanford-Brown, the court noted that because
the government never declined a payment based on non-compliance with the
ICB, precedent weighs against a finding of materiality. 132 Citing precedent from
the Supreme Court in Escobar about the government continuing to pay on claims
despite non-compliance points heavily towards it not being material. 133 On the
other side, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the government explicitly contracting
to withhold funds for non-compliance with the ICB spoke to the importance of
this provision when drafting this contract. 134 The rationale is that while drafting
the PPA, the government saw specific importance in the ICB and reserved the
right to withhold funds in the event of non-compliance. 135 These incompatible
rationalizations create precedents directly in conflict with one another.
The Tenth Circuit’s finding of materiality in regard to the ICB is unfounded
and should be substituted for an analysis closer to that of the Eighth Circuit.
Discussed earlier in the Stevens-Henager case, the court laid out five factors for
determining materiality. 136 In Escobar, the court stated that a proper analysis
must include a wide-range of factors to decide whether the provision affected
the government’s decision to enter the contract. 137 Though the Tenth Circuit
does weigh a wide-range of factors, they focus on factors that are not relevant to
the materiality analysis. 138
The Tenth Circuit in U.S. v. Stevens-Henager College misinterprets the
standard for finding materiality. 139 As the court does touch lightly on the effect
of the promise on the Department of Education’s decision to enter the contract,
which is the main focus of a materiality determination, their analysis focuses on
Steven-Henager’s actions to prove their knowledge of the provisions
importance. 140 The Tenth Circuit points towards public legislative notes from
the drafting of the PPA, annual audits from independent professionals to ensure
compliance with PPA standards, and Steven-Henager’s attempts to conceal their
132

Id. at 700.
Universal Health Serv. 136 U.S. at 2001.
134
U.S. v. Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1304.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 1303-1305.
137
Id.
138
Universal Health Serv. 136 U.S. at 2001 (“the misrepresentation must be material to the other party’s
course of action”).
139
U.S. Ex. Rel. Brooks v. Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1300, (stating “Put Simply, Steven-Henager argues that the Government has not alleged sufficient facts to establish that Stevens-Henager knew
or should have known”).
140
Id. at 1303 (noting that four out of their five determining factors pointed more towards knowledge
rather than the Department of Education attaching importance).
133
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noncompliance with the ICB. 141 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit’s determination
of materiality looks to whether the statements about their intent to comply with
the ICB were false at the time they originally entered into the PPA with the
government. 142 While all of these factors are relevant in a determination for
liability under the FCA, they are not particularly relevant in the materiality
determination. 143 The Tenth Circuit focuses heavily on facts that speak to
whether the college was aware of their practices, which speaks more to the
scienter factor in the FCA determination, rather than materiality. These are two
separate factors. Mixing the analysis of the two factors to find liability defeats
the purpose of a four-factor test. The Supreme Court in Escobar specifically
rejected the argument “that any statutory, regulatory, or contractual violation is
material so long as the defendant knows that the Government would be entitled
to refuse payment were it aware of the violation”. 144
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Escobar stated that “if the Government
pays a particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain
requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that those requirements
were not material”. 145 As pointed out in the Stevens-Henager’s Motion to
Dismiss, in the 20 year history that the ICB has been included as a provision of
the PPA, the government has never denied a payment because of noncompliance with it. 146 The Tenth Circuit admits that the Department of
Education employs independent professionals to audit these Institutions to
ensure compliance with the ICB along with other provisions. 147 However, even
after completion of the audits of Stevens-Henager College, and others who were
in violation of the ICB, the government continued to pay out Title IV funds. 148
The Department of Education hires independent auditors annually to review
operating procedures of these Institutions and ensure their compliance with the
PPA. 149 Furthermore, the government made sure to place in the contract that a
violation of a single provision gives the Department of Education the authority
141

Id.
Id. (Stating that the only way Stevens-Henager could receive federal funds was by promising to comply
with the ICB, while having intentions not to do so).
143
Id. at 1298-1299 (Discussing the four elements of an FCA claim in order to establish a promissory
fraud claim); Escobar.
144
Universal Health Serv. 136 U.S. at 2003.
145
Id.
146
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Government’s Amended Complaint in Intervention, U.S. v. StevensHenager College, 2018 WL 7446425 (June 15, 2018).
147
Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1303.
148
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Government’s Amended Complaint in Intervention, U.S. v. StevensHenager College, 2018 WL 7446425 (June 15, 2018).
149
U.S. v. Stevens-Henager College, 305 F.Supp.3d. at 1304.
142
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to revoke their ability to receive federal funds and sue for any funds received
under false pretenses. 150 Had the government felt that any evidence from their
audits warranted a withdrawal from the PPA they had full power to do so. 151 In
Stevens-Henagar College, a non-governmental individual was seeking to be
enriched by funds that the government had expressed no interest in obtaining. 152
The False Claims Act is not an all-encompassing statute to recover from any
fraudulent act by a contractor with the government. 153
The arguments the court made on their own are not sufficient to find the ICB
as a material provision to the decision of the government. However, government
practices over the past couple of years have been changing, possibly in ways that
favor a finding of materiality. 154 Recently, the government settled with for-profit
institutions violating the ICB to stop their predatory practices for tens of millions
of dollars. 155 In 2019, the Department of Justice settled with another university
due to their violation of the ICB. 156 This sudden change by the Department of
Education to go after these institutions for their violations of the ICB will be a
strong factor in future cases for the materiality determination. 157 To be even
more clear, the Department of Education can release a press statement saying
that in the future, any non-compliance with the ICB will be met with the
contractual repercussions agreed to by the parties. 158 These developments speak
to the new mindset of the Department of Education when they enter into a PPA
with contractors. 159 However, as of 2017, there is still a dispute about whether
the Department of Education has shown enough interest in the ICB for noncompliance with it to rise to the level of materiality. 160 Until the government
150

Id.
Id.
152
Id.
153
Universal Health Serv. 136 U.S. at 2002.
154
FOR-PROFIT COLLEGE COMPANY TO PAY $95.5 MILLION TO SETTLE CLAIMS OF ILLEGAL RECRUITING,
CONSUMER FRAUD AND OTHER VIOLATIONS, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/profit-college-company-pay-955-million-settle-claims-illegal-recruiting-consumer-fraud-and
(last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
155
Id.
156
SOUTH CAROLINA UNIVERSITY TO PAY $2.5 MILLION TO SETTLE FALSE CLAIMS ACT ALLEGATIONS
ARISING FROM VIOLATION OF BAN ON INCENTIVE COMPENSATION, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/south-carolina-university-pay-25-million-settle-false-claims-act-allegations-arising (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
157
Universal Health Serv. 136 U.S. at 2004 (The government stating a new policy to sue for non-compliance with certain provisions can speak to materiality).
158
Id.
159
Department of Justice, supra note 146; Department of Justice, supra note 148.
160
US ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Institute, No. 17-15111 (9th Cir. 2018) (Dissenting opinion states that the
plaintiff simply showing that the government cares about the ICB, does not make it a material factor for motion
to dismiss purposes).
151
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takes more affirmative action to demonstrate that the ICB is material in their
decision to enter into PPA’s with institutions, non-compliance with the ICB
does not rise to the level of materiality in the context of FCA analysis. 161
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